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THE SPEED OF SEQUENTIAL ASYMPTOTIC
LEARNING
WADE HANN-CARUTHERS, VADIM V. MARTYNOV AND OMER TAMUZ
Abstract. In the classical herding literature, agents receive a
private signal regarding a binary state of nature, and sequentially
choose an action, after observing the actions of their predecessors.
When the informativeness of private signals is unbounded, it is
known that agents converge to the correct action and correct be-
lief. We study how quickly convergence occurs, and show that
it happens more slowly than it does when agents observe signals.
However, we also show that the speed of learning from actions can
be arbitrarily close to the speed of learning from signals. In par-
ticular, the expected time until the agents stop taking the wrong
action can be either finite or infinite, depending on the private sig-
nal distribution. In the canonical case of Gaussian private signals
we calculate the speed of convergence precisely, and show explicitly
that, in this case, learning from actions is significantly slower than
learning from signals.
1. Introduction
When making decisions, we often rely on the decisions that others
before us have made. Sequential learning models have been used to un-
derstand different phenomena that occur when many individuals make
decisions based on the observed actions of others. These include herd
behavior (cf. [2]), where many agents make the same choice, as well
as informational cascades (e.g. [3]), where the actions of the first few
agents provide such compelling evidence that later agents no longer
have incentive to consider their own private information.
Such results on how information aggregation can fail are comple-
mented by results which demonstrate that when private signals are
arbitrarily strong, learning is robust to this kind of collapse [10]. In
particular, in a process called asymptotic learning (see, e.g., [1]), agents
will eventually choose the correct action and their beliefs will converge
The authors would like to thank Christophe Chamley, Gil Refael, Peter Sørensen,
Philipp Strack, Ye Wang, Ivo Welch and Leeat Yariv for helpful comments and
discussions. This work was supported by a grant from the Simons Foundation
(#419427, Omer Tamuz).
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to the truth. A question that has not been answered in the literature
is: how quickly does this happen? And how does the speed of learn-
ing compare to a setting in which agents observe signals rather than
actions?
We consider the classical setting of a binary state of nature and
binary actions, where each of the two actions is optimal at one of
the states. The agents receive private signals that are independent
conditioned on the state. These signals are unbounded, in the sense
that an agent’s posterior belief regarding the state can be arbitrarily
close to both 0 and 1. The agents are exogenously ordered, and, at
each time period, a single agent takes an action, after observing the
actions of her predecessors.
We measure the speed of learning by studying how the public belief
evolves as more and more agents act. Consider an outside observer
who observes the actions of the sequence of agents. The public belief is
the posterior belief that such an outside observer assigns to the correct
state of nature. It provides a measure of how well the population has
learned the state. Since signals are unbounded, the public belief tends
to 1 over time [10]; equivalently, the corresponding log-likelihood ratio
tends to infinity. As the outside observer may also be interested in
learning the state, it is natural to ask how quickly she converges to the
correct belief, and, in particular, to understand her asymptotic speed
of learning when observing actions. Asymptotic rates of convergence
are an important tool in the study of inference processes in statistical
theory, and have also been studied in social learning models in the
Economics literature (e.g., [5, 6, 12]).
When agents observe the signals (rather than actions) of all of their
predecessors, this log-likelihood ratio is asymptotically linear. Thus, it
cannot grow faster than linearly when the agents observe actions. Our
first main finding is that when observing actions, the log-likelihood ra-
tio always grows sub-linearly. Equivalently, the public belief converges
sub-exponentially to 1. Our second main finding is that, depending on
the choice of private signal distributions, the log-likelihood ratio can
grow at a rate that is arbitrarily close to linear.
We next analyze the specific canonical case of Gaussian private sig-
nals. Here we calculate precisely the asymptotic behavior of the log-
likelihood ratio of the public belief. We show that learning from actions
is significantly slower than learning from signals: the log-likelihood ra-
tio behaves asymptotically as
√
log t. To calculate this we develop a
technique that allows, much more generally, for the long-term evolu-
tion of the public belief to be calculated for a large class of signal
distributions.
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Since, in our setting of unbounded signals, agents eventually take the
correct action, an additional, natural measure of the speed of learning
is the expected time at which this happens: how long does it take until
no more mistakes are made? We call this the time to learn.
We show that the expected time to learn depends crucially on the
signal distributions. For distributions, such as the Gaussian, in which
strong signals occur with very small probability, we show that the ex-
pected time to learn is infinite.1 However, when strong signals are less
rare, this expectation is finite.2 Intuitively, when strong signals are
rare, agents are more likely to emulate their predecessors, and so it
may take a long time for a mistake to be corrected.
Finally, in the Gaussian case, we study another measure of the speed
of learning. Namely, we consider directly how the probability of choos-
ing the incorrect action varies as agents see more and more of the other
agents’ decisions before making their own. We find that this probabil-
ity is asymptotically no less than 1/t1+ε for any ε > 0. In contrast,
when agents can observe the private signals of their predecessors, the
probability of mistake decays exponentially, and so also in this sense
learning from signals is much faster than learning from actions.
1.1. Related literature. Several previous studies have considered the
same question. Chamley [4] gives an estimate for the evolution of the
public belief for a class of private signal distributions with fat tails.
He also studies the speed of convergence in the Gaussian case using
a computer simulation. Sørensen [11, Lemma 1.9] has published a
claim related to our Theorem 1, with an unfinished proof. Also in [11],
Sørensen shows that the expected time to learn is infinite for some
signal distributions, and conjectures that it is always infinite, which we
show to not be true. In [9], an early version of [10], the question of the
time to learn is also addressed, and an example is given in which the
time to learn is infinite, but is finite conditioned on one of the states. A
concurrent paper by Rosenberg and Vieille [8] studies related questions.
In particular they study the time until the first correct action, as well
as the number of incorrect actions—which are related to our time to
learn—and characterize when they have finite expectations.
A related model is studied by Lobel, Acemoglu, Dahleh and Ozdaglar [7],
who consider agents who also act sequentially, but do not observe all of
their predecessors’ actions. They study how the speed of learning varies
with the network structure. Vives [12], in a paper with a very similar
1In the benchmark case of observed signals this time is finite, for any signal
distribution.
2This result disproves a conjecture of Sørensen [11, page 36].
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spirit to ours, studies the speed of sequential learning in a model with
actions chosen from a continuum, and where agents observe a noisy
signal about their predecessors’ actions. He similarly shows that learn-
ing is significantly slower than in the benchmark case. An overview of
this literature is given by Vives in his book [13, Chapter 6].
2. Model
Let θ ∈ {−1,+1} be the true state of the world, with each state
a priori equally likely3. Each rational agent t ∈ {1, 2, . . .} receives a
private signal st. The signals are i.i.d. conditioned on θ: if θ = +1 they
have cumulative distribution function (CDF) F+ and if θ = −1 they
have CDF F−.4 We assume that F+ and F− are absolutely continuous
with respect to each other, so that private signals never completely
reveal the state.
Let
Lt = log
P(θ = +1|st)
P(θ = −1|st)
be the log-likelihood ratio of the belief induced by the agent’s private
signal. We assume that private signals are unbounded, in the sense
that Lt is unbounded: for every M ∈ R the probability that Lt > M
is positive, as is the probability that Lt < −M . We denote by G+ and
G− the conditional CDFs of Lt.
The agents act sequentially, with agent t acting after observing the
actions of agents {1, . . . , t−1}. The utility of the action at ∈ {−1,+1}
is 1 if at = θ and 0 otherwise.
Denote the public belief by
µt = P(θ = +1|a1, . . . , at−1).
This is the posterior held by an outside observer after recording the
actions of the first t − 1 agents. We denote by ℓt the log-likelihood
ratio of the public belief:
ℓt = log
µt
1− µt ·
3We make this simplification of a (1/2,1/2) prior to reduce the complexity of the
presentation, but all results hold for general priors.
4One could consider signals that take values in a general measurable space (rather
than R), but the choice of R is in fact without loss of generality, since all standard
measurable spaces are isomorphic.
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In equilibrium, agent t chooses at = +1 iff
5
log
P(θ = +1|a1, . . . , at−1, st)
P(θ = −1|a1, . . . , at−1, st) > 0.
A simple calculation shows that this occurs iff
ℓt + Lt > 0.
Now, another straightforward calculation shows that when at = +1,
ℓt+1 = ℓt +D+(ℓt),(1)
where
D+(x) = log
1−G+(−x)
1−G−(−x) ·
Likewise, when at = −1,
ℓt+1 = ℓt +D−(ℓt),
where
D−(x) = log
G+(−x)
G−(−x) ·
We can interpret D+(ℓt) and D−(ℓt) as the contributions of agent t’s
action to the public belief.
3. The evolution of public belief
Consider a baseline model, in which each agent observes the private
signals of all of her predecessors. In this case the public log-likelihood
ratio ℓ˜t would equal the sum
ℓ˜t =
t∑
τ=1
Lτ .
Conditioned on the state this is the sum of i.i.d. random variables, and
so by the law of large numbers we have that the limit limt ℓ˜t/t would—
conditioned on (say) θ = +1—equal the conditional expectation of Lt,
which is positive.6
5For simplicity, we assume that agents choose action −1 when indifferent. This
will have no impact on our results.
6In fact, E(Lt|θ = +1) is equal to the Kullback-Leibler divergence between F+
and F−, which is positive as long as the two distributions are different.
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3.1. Sub-linear public beliefs. Our first main result shows that when
agents observe actions rather than signals, the public log-likelihood ra-
tio grows sub-linearly, and so learning from actions is always slower
than learning from signals.
Theorem 1. It holds with probability 1 that limt ℓt/t = 0.
Our second main result shows that, depending on the choice of pri-
vate signal distributions, ℓt can grow at a rate that is arbitrarily close
to linear: given any sub-linear function rt, it is possible to find private
signal distributions so that ℓt grows as fast as rt.
Theorem 2. For any r : N → R>0 such that limt rt/t = 0 there exists
a choice of CDFs F− and F+ such that
lim inf
t→∞
|ℓt|
rt
> 0
with probability 1.
For example, for some choice of private signal distributions, ℓt grows
asymptotically at least as fast as t/ log t, which is sub-linear but (per-
haps) close to linear.
3.2. Long-term behavior of public beliefs. We next turn to esti-
mating more precisely the long-term behavior of the public log-likelihood
ratio ℓt. Since signals are unbounded, agents learn the state, so that
ℓt tends to +∞ if θ = +1, and to −∞ if θ = −1. In particular ℓt
stops changing sign from some t on, with probability 1; all later agents
choose the correct action.
We consider without loss of generality the case that θ = +1, so that
ℓt is positive from some t on. Thus, recalling (1), we have that from
some t on,
ℓt+1 = ℓt +D+(ℓt).
This is the recurrence relation that we need to solve in order to un-
derstand the long term evolution of ℓt. To this end, we consider the
corresponding differential equation:
df
dt
(t) = D+(f(t)).
Recall that G− is the CDF of the private log-likelihood ratio Lt, con-
ditioned on θ = −1. We show (Lemma 8) that D+(x) is well approxi-
mated by G−(−x) for high x, in the sense that
lim
x→∞
D+(x)
G−(−x) = 1.
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In some applications (including the Gaussian one, which we consider
below), the expression for G− is simpler than that for D+, and so one
can instead consider the differential equation
df
dt
(t) = G−(−f(t)).(2)
This equation can be solved analytically in many cases in which G− has
a simple form. For example, if G−(−x) = e−x then f(t) = log(t + c),
and if G−(−x) = x−k then f(t) = ((k + 1) · t + c)1/(k+1).
We show that solutions to this equation have the same long term
behavior as ℓt, given that G− satisfies some regularity conditions.
Theorem 3. Suppose that G− and G+ are continuous, and that the left
tail of G− is convex and differentiable. Suppose also that f : R>0 → R>0
satisfies
df
dt
(t) = G−(−f(t))(3)
for all sufficiently large t. Then conditional on θ = +1,
lim
t→∞
ℓt
f(t)
= 1
with probability 1.
The condition7 on G− is satisfied when the random variables Lt (i.e.,
the log-likelihood ratios associated with the private signals), condi-
tioned on θ = −1, have a distribution with a probability density func-
tion that is monotone decreasing for all x less than some x0. This
is the case for the normal distribution, and for practically every non-
atomic distribution one may encounter in the standard probability and
statistics literatures.
3.2.1. Gaussian signals. In the Gaussian case, F+ is Normal with mean
+1 and variance σ2, and F− is Normal with mean −1 and the same
variance. A simple calculation shows that G− is the Gaussian cu-
mulative distribution function, and so we cannot solve the differential
equation (2) analytically. However, we can bound G−(x) from above
and from below by functions of the form e−c·x
2
/x. For these functions
the solution to (2) is of the form f(t) =
√
log t, and so we can use
Theorem 3 to deduce the following.
7By “the left tail of G− is convex and differentiable” we mean that there is some
x0 such that, restricted to (−∞, x0), G− is convex and differentiable.
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Theorem 4. When private signals are Gaussian, then conditioned on
θ = +1,
lim
t→∞
ℓt
(2
√
2/σ) · √log t = 1
with probability 1.
Recall, that when private signals are observed, the public log-likelihood
ratio ℓt is asymptotically linear. Thus, learning from actions is far
slower than learning from signals in the Gaussian case.
3.3. The expected time to learn. When private signals are un-
bounded then with probability 1 the agents eventually all choose the
correct action at = θ. A natural question is: how long does it take for
that to happen? Formally, we define the time to learn
TL = min{t : aτ = θ for all τ ≥ t},
and study its expectation. Note that in the baseline case of observed
signals TL has finite expectation, since the probability of a mistake at
time t decays exponentially with t.
We first study the expectation of TL in the case of Gaussian signals.
To this end we define the time of first mistake by
T1 = min{t : at 6= θ}
if at 6= θ for some t, and by T1 = 0 otherwise. We calculate a lower
bound for the distribution of T1, showing that it decays at most as fast
as 1/t.
Theorem 5. When private signals are Gaussian then for every ε > 0
there exists a k > 0 such that for all t
P(T1 = t) ≥ k
t1+ε
·
Thus T1 has a very thick tail, decaying far slower than the exponen-
tial decay of the baseline case. In particular, T1 has infinite expectation,
and so, since TL > T1, the expectation of the time to learn TL is also
infinite.
In contrast, we show that when private signals have thick tails—that
is, when the probability of a strong signal vanishes slowly enough—then
the time to learn has finite expectation. In particular, we show this
when the left tail of G− and the right tail of G+ are polynomial.8
8Recall that G− is the conditional cumulative distribution function of the private
log-likelihood ratios Lt.
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Theorem 6. Assume that G−(−x) = c·x−k and that G+(x) = 1−c·x−k
for some c > 0 and k > 0, and for all x greater than some x0. Then
E(TL) <∞.
An example of private signal distributions F+ and F− for which G−
and G+ have this form is given by the probability density functions
f−(x) =


c · e−xx−k−1 when 1 ≤ x
0 when − 1 < x < 1
c · (−x)−k−1 when x ≤ −1.
and f+(x) = f−(−x), for an appropriate choice of normalizing constant
c > 0. In this case G−(−x) = 1−G+(x) = ckx−k for all x > 1.9
The proof of Theorem 6 is rather technically involved, and we provide
here a rough sketch of the ideas behind it.
We say that there is an upset at time t if at−1 6= at. We denote by Ξ
the random variable which assigns to each outcome the total number
of upsets
Ξ = |{t : at−1 6= at}|.
We say that there is a run of length m from time t if at = at+1 =
· · · = at+m−1. As we will condition on θ = +1 in our analysis, we say
that a run from time t is good if at = 1 and bad otherwise. A trivial
but important observation is that the number of maximal finite runs
is equal to the number of upsets, and so, if Ξ = n, and if TL = t, then
there is at least one run of length t/n before time t. Qualitatively, this
implies that if the number of upsets is small, and if the time to learn
is large, then there is at least one long run before the time to learn.
We show that it is indeed unlikely that Ξ is large: the distribution
of Ξ has an exponential tail. Incidentally, this holds for any private
signal distribution:
Proposition 7. For every private signal distribution there exist c > 0
and 0 < γ < 1 such that for all n > 0
P(Ξ ≥ n) ≤ cγn.
Intuitively, this holds because whenever an agent takes the correct
action, there is a non-vanishing probability that all subsequent agents
will also do so, and no more upsets will occur.
9Theorem 6 can be proved for other thick-tailed private signal distributions: for
example, one could take different values of c and k for G− and G+, or one could
replace their thick polynomial tails by even thicker logarithmic tails. For the sake
of readability we choose to focus on this case.
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Thus, it is very unlikely that the number of upsets Ξ is large. As
we observe above, when Ξ is small then the time to learn TL can only
be large if at least one of the runs is long. When G− has a thin tail
then this is possible; indeed, Theorem 5 shows that the first finite
run has infinite expected length when private signals are Gaussian.
However, when G− has a thick, polynomial left tail of order x−k, we
show that it is very unlikely for any run to be long: the probability
that there is a run of length n decays at least as fast as exp(−nk/(k+1)),
and in particular runs have finite expected length. Intuitively, when
strong signals are rare then runs tend to be long, as agents are likely
to emulate their predecessor. Conversely, when strong signals are more
likely then agents are more likely to break a run, and so runs tend to
be shorter.
Putting together these insights, we conclude that it is unlikely that
there are many runs, and, in the polynomial signal case, it is unlikely
that runs are long. Thus TL has finite expectation.
3.4. Probability of taking the wrong action. Yet another natural
metric of the speed of learning is the probability of mistake
pt = P(at 6= θ).
Calculating the asymptotic behavior of pt seems harder to tackle.
For the Gaussian case, while we cannot estimate pt precisely, The-
orem 5 immediately implies a lower bound: pt is at least k/t
1+ε, for
every ε > 0 and k that depends on ε. This is much larger than the
exponentially vanishing probability of mistake in the revealed signal
baseline case.
More generally, we can use Theorem 1 to show that pt vanishes sub-
exponentially for any signal distribution, in the sense that
lim
t→∞
1
t
log pt = 0.
To see this, note that the probability of mistake at time t − 1, condi-
tioned on the observed actions, is exactly equal to
min{µt, 1− µt};
where we recall that
µt = P(θ = +1|a1, . . . , at−1) = e
ℓt
eℓt + 1
is the public belief. This is due to the fact that if the outside observer,
who holds belief µt, had to choose an action, she would choose at−1, the
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action of the last player she observed, a player who has strictly more
information than her. Thus
pt = E(min{µt, 1− µt}) = E
(
1
e|ℓt| + 1
)
,
and since, by Theorem 1, |ℓt| is sub-linear, it follows that pt is sub-
exponential.
4. Conclusion
In this paper we consider a classical setting of sequential asymptotic
learning from actions of others. We show that learning from actions
is slow, as compared to the speed of learning when observing others’
private signals, in the sense that the public log-likelihood ratio tends
more slowly to infinity. However, it is possible to approach the linear
rate of learning from signals and achieve any sub-linear rate.
We calculate the speed of learning precisely in the case of Normal
private signals (among a large class of private signal distributions) and
show that learning is very slow. We also show that in the Gaussian
case the expected time to learn is infinite, as opposed to cases of more
thick-tailed distributions, in which it is finite.
For the Gaussian case we also provide a lower bound for the prob-
ability of mistake. Finding a matching upper bound seems beyond
our reach at the moment, and provides a compelling open problem for
further research.
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Appendix A. Sub-linear learning
Before proving our main theorems we make the observation (which
has appeared before, e.g., [4]) that the log-likelihood ratio of the log-
likelihood ratio is the log-likelihood ratio. Formally, if ν+ and ν− are
the conditional distributions of the private log-likelihood ratio Lt (i.e.,
have CDFs G+ and G−), then
log
dν+
dν−
(x) = x.
It follows that
G+(x) =
∫ x
−∞
dν+(ζ) =
∫ x
−∞
eζ dν−(ζ).(4)
Our first lemma shows that asymptotically, D+ behaves like the left
tail of G−, and D− behaves like the right tail of G+.
Lemma 8.
lim
x→∞
D+(x)
G−(−x) = 1 and limx→−∞
D−(x)
G+(−x)− 1 = 1.
Proof. By definition,
D+(x) = log
1−G+(−x)
1−G−(−x) .
Since log(1− z) = −z +O(z2), it holds for all x large enough that
D+(x) > G−(−x)− 2 ·G+(−x).
Applying (4) yields
D+(x) >
∫ −x
−∞
(1− 2eζ) dν−(ζ),
and so for any ε and all x large enough,
D+(x) > (1− ǫ) ·
∫ −x
−∞
dν−(ζ) = (1− ǫ)G−(−x).
Using the same approximation of the logarithm, we have that
D+(x) < (1 + ǫ)G−(−x)−G+(−x) < (1 + ǫ)G−(−x).
The statement for D+ now follows by taking ε to zero. The correspond-
ing bounds on D− follow by identical arguments. 
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Proof of Theorem 1. Condition on θ = +1. Then ℓt is with probability
1 positive from some point on, and all agents take action +1 from this
point on. Hence, for all t large enough,
ℓt+1 = ℓt +D+(ℓt).
By Lemma 8, we know that limxD+(x) = 0. Hence for every ǫ > 0 and
all t large enough, |ℓt+1− ℓt| < ǫ. It follows that the limit limt ℓt/t = 0.
The analysis of the case θ = −1 is identical. 
Proof of Theorem 2. Given rt, we will construct private signal distri-
butions such that lim inft |ℓt|/rt > 0 with probability one. These distri-
butions will furthermore have the property that D+(x) = −D−(−x).
As a consequence we have that regardless of the action chosen by the
agent, as long as the sign of the action is equal to that of ℓt (which
happens from some point on w.p. 1),
|ℓt+1| = |ℓt|+D+(|ℓt|).
Intuitively, if we can choose private signal distributions that make
D+(x) decay very slowly, then ℓt will be very close to being linear.
Formally, and by elementary considerations, the theorem will follow
if, for every Q : R → R>0 with limx→∞Q(x) = 0, we can find CDFs
such that D+(x) = −D−(−x) and lim infx→∞D+(x)/Q(x) > 0.
Fix any Q such that limx→∞Q(x) = 0, but assume without loss of
generality that Q(x) is monotone decreasing.10 Define a finite measure
ν on the integers by
ν(n) =
Q(n− 1)−Q(n)
en
and
ν(−n) = Q(n− 1)−Q(n)
for all n ≥ 0. Note that ν is indeed finite since
C :=
∞∑
n=−∞
ν(n) ≤ 2Q(−1).
Note also that
∞∑
n=−∞
ν(n) · en
is likewise equal to C.
10If Q is not monotone decreasing then consider instead Q′(x) = supy≥xQ(y).
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Let the private signal distributions be given by
P(st = n|θ = +1) = C−1ν(n)en
and
P(st = n|θ = −1) = C−1ν(n).
Then
Lt = log
P(st|θ = +1)
P(st|θ = −1) = st,
the distribution of Lt is identical to that of st, and so G+ = F+ and
G− = F−. By our definition of F−, we have that for x > 0
G−(−x) = C−1 ·Q(⌈x⌉ − 1).(5)
Now, by Lemma 8, we know that
(1− ǫ) ·G−(−x) < D+(x) < (1 + ǫ) ·G−(−x),
for any ǫ > 0 and all x large enough. It follows that
lim inf
x→∞
D+(x)
Q(x)
= lim inf
x→∞
G−(−x)
Q(x)
,
which, by (5) equals
lim inf
x→∞
C−1Q(⌈x⌉ − 1)
Q(x)
≥ C−1.

Appendix B. Long-term behavior of public belief
The primary goal of this section is to prove Theorem 3, which states
that public belief is asymptotically given by the solution to the differ-
ential equation (3). The proof of this theorem uses two general lemmas
regarding recurrence relations. We state these lemmas now and prove
them later. The first lemma states that two similar recurrence relations
yield similar solutions. The second shows that the solution to a recur-
rence relation (of the type we are interested in) is well approximated
by the solution to the corresponding differential equation.
Lemma 9. Let A,B : R>0 → R>0 be continuous, eventually monotone
decreasing, and tending to zero.
Let (at) and (bt) be sequences satisfying the recurrence relations
at+1 = at + A(at)
bt+1 = bt +B(bt).
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Suppose
lim
x→∞
A(x)
B(x)
= 1.
Then
lim
t→∞
at
bt
= 1.
Lemma 10. Assume that A : R>0 → R>0 is a continuous function with
a convex differentiable tail, and that A(x) goes to 0 as x goes to ∞. Let
(at) be any sequence satisfying the recurrence equation at+1 = at+A(at),
and suppose there is a function f : R>0 → R>0 with f ′(t) = A(f(t))
for all sufficiently large t. Then
lim
t→∞
f(t)
at
= 1.
Given these lemmas, we are ready to prove our theorem.
Proof of Theorem 3. Let (at) be any sequence in R>0 satisfying:
at+1 = at +G−(−at).
Then by Lemma 10, the sequence (at) is well approximated by f(t),
the solution to the corresponding differential equation:
lim
t→∞
at
f(t)
= 1.
Now, conditional on θ = +1, all agents take action +1 from some point
on with probability 1. Thus, with probability 1,
ℓt+1 = ℓt +D+(ℓt)
for all sufficiently large t. Further, by Lemma 8,
lim
x→∞
D+(x)
G−(−x) = 1.
So by Lemma 9,
lim
t→∞
ℓt
at
= 1
with probability 1. Thus, we have
lim
t→∞
ℓt
f(t)
= lim
t→∞
ℓt
at
· at
f(t)
= 1
with probability 1. 
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B.1. Proofs of Lemmas 9 and 10.
Proof of Lemma 9. We prove the claim in two steps. First, we show
that for every ε > 0 there are infinitely many times t such that
(1− ε)at ≤ bt ≤ (1 + ε)at.(6)
Second, we show that if (6) holds for some t large enough, then it holds
for all t′ > t, proving the claim.
We start with step 1. Assume without loss of generality that at ≤ bt
for infinitely many values of t. Fix ε > 0. To show that (1 − ε)at ≤
bt ≤ (1 + ε)at holds for infinitely many values of t, let x0 > 1 be such
that for all x > x0 it holds that A and B are monotone decreasing,
A(x), B(x) < ε < 1
and
(1− ε/2)A(x) < B(x) < (1 + ε/2)A(x).(7)
Assume that at, bt > x0; this will indeed be the case for t large
enough, since A and B are positive and continuous, and so both at and
bt are monotone increasing and tend to infinity. So
B(bt) < (1 + ε/2)A(bt) ≤ (1 + ε/2)A(at),
where the first inequality follows from (7), and the second follows from
the fact that A is monotone decreasing and at < bt. Since B(b(t)) =
bt+1 − b(t) and A(at) = at+1 − a(t) we have shown that
bt+1 − bt < (1 + ε/2)(at+1 − at),
and so eventually bt ≤ (1 + ε)at. Also, notice that the first time this
obtains, we also have that the left inequality in (6) holds at the same
moment:
bt > bt−1 > at−1 = at − (at − at−1) > at − ε > at − εat = (1− ε)at.
This completes the first step. Now we go to step 2. Here we show that
if (6) holds for large enough t then it holds for all t′ > t.
Fix ε > 0, and let x0 be defined as above. Suppose that (1− ε)at <
bt < (1 + ε)at, with at, bt > x0. Assume without loss of generality that
bt ≥ at. Then our assumptions and (7) imply
bt+1 = bt +B(bt)
< (1 + ε)at + (1 + ε)A(bt).
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Because at ≤ bt and A is decreasing we have
bt+1 < (1 + ε)at + (1 + ε)A(at)
= (1 + ε)at+1.
For the other direction, note first that
bt+1 > bt ≥ at,
by assumption. We can write at = (1−ε)at+εat, and since at > x0 > 1,
εat > (1− ε)ε, and so
bt+1 > (1− ε)at + (1− ε)ε.
Now, ε > A(at) since at > x0, and so
bt+1 > (1− ε)at + (1− ε)A(at)
= (1− ε)at+1.
Thus
(1− ε)at+1 < bt+1 < (1 + ε)at+1,(8)
as required.

Proof of Lemma 10. We restrict the domain of f to the interval (t0,∞)
such that for t > t0 it already holds that f
′(t) = A(f(t)). Since A is
continuous, limt→∞ f(t) = ∞, and so we can also assume that in the
interval (f(t0),∞) it holds that A is convex and differentiable.
Since f is strictly increasing in (t0,∞), it has an inverse f−1. For x
large enough define B(x) = f(f−1(x) + 1)− x.
Now, let (bt) be any sequence satisfying the recurrence relation
bt+1 = bt +B(bt).
In order to apply Lemma 9, we will first show that
lim
x→∞
B(x)
A(x)
= 1.
Let t = f−1(x). Such a t exists and is unique for all sufficiently large
x, because f is monotone. Notice that by the definitions of B(x) and
f ′(x)
B(x) = f(f−1(x) + 1)− x
= f(f−1(x) + 1)− x− f ′(f−1(x)) + f ′(f−1(x))
= f(t+ 1)− f(t)− f ′(t) + A(f(t)),
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where in the last equality we substitute t = f−1(x). Because f ′ is
positive and decreasing (f is concave) then f(t+ 1)− f(t) ≥ f ′(t+ 1),
and so
B(x) ≥ f ′(t+ 1)− f ′(t) + A(f(t)).
By the definition of f , f ′(t) = A(f(t)), and so
B(x) ≥ A(f(t+ 1))−A(f(t)) + A(f(t)) = A(f(t + 1)).
Again, due to concavity of f we have f(t+ 1) ≤ f(t) + f ′(t) and as A
is decreasing and convex we get
B(x) ≥ A(f(t) + f ′(t))
≥ A′(f(t))f ′(t) + A(f(t))
= A′(f(t))A(f(t)) + A(f(t)).
We now substitute back x = f(t):
B(x) ≥ A′(x)A(x) + A(x)
= A(x)(A′(x) + 1)
so in particular, since A′(x)→ 0 as x→∞,
lim inf
x→∞
B(x)
A(x)
≥ 1.
Now we are going to show that lim supx→∞
B(x)
A(x)
≤ 1 which will con-
clude the proof. By the definitions of f−1(x) and B(x)
B(x) = B(f(t)) = f(t+ 1)− f(t) =
∫ t+1
t
f ′(ζ) dζ.
As f ′ is decreasing it follows that
B(x) ≤
∫ t+1
t
f ′(t) dζ = f ′(t) = A(f(t)) = A(x).
Therefore,
lim sup
x→∞
B(x)
A(x)
≤ 1.
Hence, from these two inequalities we get that
lim
x→∞
B(x)
A(x)
= 1.
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Now notice that, by construction, f(t+ 1) = f(t) +B(f(t)). Thus, by
Lemma 9,
lim
n→∞
f(t)
at
= 1.

B.2. Monotonicity of solutions to a differential equation. We
now prove a general lemma regarding differential equations of the form
a′(t) = A(a(t)). It shows that the solutions to this equation are mono-
tone in A. This is useful for calculating approximate analytic solutions
whenever it is impossible to find analytic exact solutions, as is the case
of Gaussian signals, in which we use this lemma.
Lemma 11. Let A,B : R>0 → R>0 be continuous, and let a, b : R>0 →
R>0 satisfy a
′(t) = A(a(t)) and b′(t) = B(b(t)) for all sufficiently large
t.
Suppose that
lim inf
x→∞
A(x)
B(x)
> 1.
Then a(t) > b(t) for all sufficiently large t.
Proof. Notice that a(t) and b(t) are eventually monotone increasing and
tend to infinity as t tends to infinity. Thus for all x greater than some
x0 > 0 large enough, a and b have inverses that satisfy the following
differential equations:
d
dx
a−1(x) =
1
A(x)
d
dx
b−1(x) =
1
B(x)
·
Since lim infxA(x)/B(x) > 1, we can furthermore choose x0 so that for
all x ≥ x0, A(x) > (1 + ε)B(x) for some ε > 0. Thus, for x > x0
a−1(x) = a−1(x0) +
∫ x
x0
1
A(x)
dx
b−1(x) = b−1(x0) +
∫ x
x0
1
B(x)
dx
and so
a−1(x) < a−1(x0) +
1
1 + ε
∫ x
x0
1
B(x)
dx
= a−1(x0) +
1
1 + ε
(b−1(x)− b−1(x0))
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and thus
a−1(x)− b−1(x) < − ε
1 + ε
b−1(x) +
[
a−1(x0)− 1
1 + ε
b−1(x0)
]
.
Since b−1(x) tends to infinity as x tends to infinity, it follows that for
all sufficiently large x, a−1(x) < b−1(x). Thus, for all sufficiently large
t
t = a−1(a(t)) < b−1(a(t)),
and so, since b(t) is monotone increasing,
b(t) < a(t).

B.3. Eventual monotonicity of public belief update. We end this
section with a lemma that shows that under some technical conditions
on the left tail of G−, the function u+(x) = x+D+(x) (i.e., the function
that determines how the public log-likelihood ratio is updated when the
action +1 is taken) is eventually monotone increasing.
Lemma 12. Suppose G− has a convex and differentiable left tail. Then
the map u+(x) = x+D+(x) is monotone increasing for all sufficiently
large x.
Proof. Recall that
D+(x) = log
1−G+(−x)
1−G−(−x) ·
Since G− has a differentiable left tail, it has a derivative g−(−x) for all
x large enough. It then follows from (4) that G+ also has a derivative
in this domain, and
u′+(x) = 1 +
g+(−x)
1−G+(−x) −
g−(−x)
1−G−(−x)
= 1 +
e−xg−(−x)
1−G+(−x) −
g−(−x)
1−G−(−x) ·
Since 1−G−(−x) and 1−G+(−x) tend to 1 as x tends to infinity,
lim
x→∞
u′+(x) = lim
x→∞
1 + e−xg−(−x)− g−(−x).
Since G− is eventually convex, g−(−x) tends to zero, and therefore
lim
x→∞
u′+(x) = 1.
In particular, u′+(x) is positive for x large enough, and hence u+(x) is
eventually monotone increasing. 
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Appendix C. Gaussian private signals
C.1. Preliminaries. We say that private signals are Gaussian when
F− is the normal distribution with mean −1 and variance σ2, and F+
is the normal distribution with mean +1 and variance σ2. To calculate
the evolution of ℓt, we need to calculate G+ and G−, the conditional
distributions of the private log-likelihood ratio Lt. Notice that in this
case
Lt = log
e−(st−1)
2/2σ2
e−(st−(−1))2/2σ2
= 2st/σ
2,
so that Lt is simply proportional to the signal st. It follows that Lt is
also normally distributed, conditioned on the state θ, and that G+ and
G− are cumulative distribution functions of Gaussians, with variance
4/σ2.
C.1.1. Notation. In this section and those that follow, we denote by ℓ∗t
the public log-likelihood ratio when all agents before agent t take the
correct action. Formally,
ℓ∗t = log
P(θ = +1 | a1 = · · · = at−1 = +1)
P(θ = −1 | a1 = · · · = at−1 = +1) ·
For convenience, we will also use the notation P+(·) as shorthand for
P(· | θ = +1).
C.2. The evolution of public belief.
Proof of Theorem 4. Let f : R>0 → R>0 be any function such that
f ′(t) = G−(−f(t)) for all sufficiently large t. Then by Theorem 3,
lim
t→∞
ℓt
f(t)
= 1
with probability 1.
Recall from above that Lt is distributed normally, and G−(−x) is
the CDF of a normal distribution with variance τ 2 = 4/σ2.
For 1 > η ≥ 0, define
Fη(x) =
e−
1−η
2τ2
x2
x
fη(t) =
√
2τ√
1− η
√
log(t) + log
(1− η)2
2τ 2
·
THE SPEED OF SEQUENTIAL ASYMPTOTIC LEARNING 23
By a routine application of L’Hospital’s rule, F0 and Fη are lower and
upper bounds for G−, in the sense that
lim
x→∞
G−(−x)
F0(x)
=∞
lim
x→∞
Fη(x)
G−(−x) =∞, η > 0.
Since f ′η(t) = Fη(fη(t)) for all sufficiently large t, we have by Lemma 11
that for any η > 0,
f0(t) < f(t) < fη(t)
for all sufficiently large t. So
lim inf
t→∞
f(t)√
2τ
√
log t
= lim inf
t→∞
f(t)
f0(t)
≥ 1
and for any η > 0,
lim sup
t→∞
f(t)√
2τ
√
log t
=
1√
1− η · lim supt→∞
f(t)
fη(t)
≤ 1√
1− η ·
Thus,
lim
t→∞
f(t)√
2τ
√
log t
= lim
t→∞
f(t)
(2
√
2/σ)
√
log t
= 1
so with probability 1,
lim
t→∞
ℓt
(2
√
2/σ)
√
log t
= lim
t→∞
ℓt
f(t)
· f(t)
(2
√
2/σ)
√
log t
= 1.

To prove Theorem 5, we will need two lemmas. The first is general,
and will be used several times in the sequel, while the second deals
exclusively with the Gaussian case.
Denote by Et the event that aτ = +1 for all τ ≥ t; that is, that there
are no more mistakes after time t. The next lemma provides a uniform
bound for the probability of Et, conditioned on the public belief. It
implies, in particular, that the probability of E1 is positive, which we
will use in the proof of Theorem 5.
Lemma 13. Suppose G− and G+ are continuous, and G− has a convex
and differentiable left tail. Then for every L ∈ R, there is some mL > 0
such that for any t, x ≥ L implies P+(Et | ℓt = x) ≥ mL.
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Proof. Recall the definition of the public belief µt = P(θ = +1|a1, . . . , at−1).
The process (µ1, µ2, . . .) is a bounded martingale, and therefore, by a
standard argument on bounded martingales, if we condition on µt = q,
then the probability that µτ ≤ 1/2 for some τ > t is at most 2(1−q).11
This event is precisely the complement of Et, and therefore we have
that P(Et |µt = q) is at least 2q − 1. Hence, conditioning on θ = +1,
we have that P+(Et |µt = 1− q) ≥ (2q − 1)/q, which is positive for all
q > 1/2.
Since µt = q is equivalent to ℓt = log q/(1− q), what we have shown
implies that there is an ε > 0 such that for all x ≥ 1 (here the choice
of 1 is arbitrary and can be replaced with any positive number)
P+(Et | ℓt = x) > ε.
Now, for any L < 1, the compactness of the interval [L, 1], together
with the continuity of G− and G+, implies that there is an nL such
that if ℓt ≥ L, and if agents t through t+ nL − 1 take action +1, then
ℓt+nL > 1. Further, since the probability of agents t through t+nL− 1
all taking action +1 conditional on ℓt = x is continuous in x, there is
a pL > 0 such that
P+(Et | ℓt = x) ≥ pL · ε
since with probability at least pL there are no mistakes up to time
t+ nL, and thence there are no mistakes with probability at least ε.

Lemma 14. Assume private signals are Gaussian. For every ε > 0
there exists some k > 0 such that for all t,
P+(at = −1 | aτ = +1 for all τ < t) > k
t1+ε
·
Proof. By the definitions of ℓ∗t and G+,
P+(at = −1 | aτ = +1 for all τ < t) = P+(at = −1 | ℓt = ℓ∗t )
= G+(−ℓ∗t ).
Now, by Theorem 4, for every β > 0, ℓ∗t < (1 + β)
2
√
2
σ
√
log t for all
sufficiently large t. Further, it follows from a routine application of
L’Hopital’s rule (or from the standard asymptotic expansion for the
CDF of a normal distribution) that for all sufficiently large x,
G+(−x) > e
−(σ2/8)x2
x
·
11Intuitively, if I assign high belief now to the event θ = +1, then the probability
that I assign this event low belief in the future must be small.
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Let ε > 0, and take β <
√
1 + ε− 1. Then by monotonicity of G+(−x)
and a straightforward calculation,
G+(−ℓ∗t ) > G+(−(1 + β)
2
√
2
σ
√
log t)
>
[
1
(1 + β)2
√
2
σ
]
· t
(1+ε)−(1+β)2
√
log t
· 1
t1+ε
>
1
t1+ε
for all sufficiently large t. From this, the claim follows immediately.

Proof of Theorem 5. Denote by Ct be the event that aτ = +1 for all
τ < t, and note that the event T1 = t is simply the intersection of Ct
with the event that at = −1.
Let ε > 0. By Lemma 14 there is some k′ > 0 such that for all t,
P+(at = −1 |Ct) > k
′
t1+ε
·
Now, put γ = P+(aτ = +1 for all τ ≥ 1), the probability that all
agents take the correct action. By Lemma 13, γ > 0, so this provides
a lower bound on the probability of the first t − 1 agents taking the
correct action. Formally,
P+(Ct) ≥ P+(aτ = +1 for all τ ≥ 1) = γ.
Thus,
P+(T1 = t) = P+(at = −1, Ct)
= P+(at = −1 |Ct) · P+(Ct)
≥ γk
′
t1+ε
for all t.

Appendix D. Upsets and runs
We recall a few definitions from Section 3.3. We say that there is
an upset at time t if at−1 6= at. We denote by Ξ the random variable
which assigns to each outcome the total number of upsets, and by Ξt
the total number of upsets at times up to and including t. We say that
there is a run of length m from t if at = at+1 = · · · = at+m−1. Note that
this definition does not preclude a run from being part of a longer run;
we will refer to a run of finite length which is not strictly contained in
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any other run as maximal. We say that a run from t is good if at = +1
and bad otherwise.
Notice that the number of maximal runs is exactly equal to the num-
ber of upsets. We use this observation now to show that the probability
of having many maximal runs is very small, so that most of the prob-
ability is concentrated in the outcomes with few maximal runs.
Proof of Proposition 7. Denote by Υ the random variable which assigns
to each outcome the number of finite maximal good runs it contains;
note that with probability 1, Υ is finite.
By Lemma 13, there is a β > 0 such that for any x ≥ 0, if ℓt = x,
then the probability that all agents from t on take the correct action
is at least β. Formally,12
P+(aτ = +1 for all τ ≥ t | ℓt = x) ≥ β.
Thus, whenever at−1 = −1 and at = +1 (or t = 1), the probability
that there is exactly one more maximal good run is at most 1 − β. It
follows that for n ≥ 0,
P+(Υ = n + 1) ≤ (1− β)P+(Υ = n)
and thus, for any n ≥ 0,
P+(Υ = n) ≤ (1− β)nP+(Υ = 0)
and so
P+(Υ ≥ n) ≤ P+(Υ = 0)
β
· (1− β)n.
Finally, since Υ = ⌊Ξ/2⌋, we have for any n:
P+(Ξ ≥ n) ≤ P+(Υ ≥ ⌊n/2⌋) ≤ c · γn
where c = P+(Υ = 0)/β and γ = (1− β) 13 .

Whenever asymptotic learning occurs (that is, whenever the proba-
bility that all agents take the correct action from some point on is equal
to 1), the total number of upsets is almost surely finite. In particular,
the probability that Ξt is logarithmic in t tends to zero as t tends to
infinity. Using Proposition 7, we can show that in fact this probability
tends to 0 quickly:
Corollary 15. Let c, γ be as in Proposition 7. Then
P(Ξt ≥ − 2.1
log γ
log t) ≤ c · 1
t2.1
·
12We remind the reader that P+(·) is shorthand for P(· | θ = +1).
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Proof.
P(Ξt ≥ − 2.1
log γ
log t) ≤ P(Ξ ≥ − 2.1
log γ
log t)
≤ c · γ− 2.1log γ log t
= c · 1
t2.1
·

In fact, it is equally easy to show the same statement for exponents
larger than 2.1, but this will suffice for our purposes.
One important consequence of Corollary 15 is that with high prob-
ability, there is at least one maximal run before time t which is long
relative to t. Thus, much of the dynamics is controlled by what happens
during long runs.
We previously analyzed only long runs that start at time 1, when
the public log-likelihood ratio is equal to 0. If a long run starts at some
public belief ℓt 6= 0 then its evolution is different from the former case.
However, if the run is long enough then the analysis above can still be
applied. The following lemma states that if a run starts at some ℓt > 0
then we can bound the future public belief from below using ℓ∗.
Lemma 16. Suppose that G− has a convex and differentiable left tail.
Then there exists a z > 0 such that, if there is a good run of length s
from t, then ℓt+s ≥ ℓ∗s−z.
Proof. Let u+(x) = x + D+(x). Then by (1), whenever agent t takes
action +1, ℓt+1 = u+(ℓt).
Since G− is eventually convex and differentiable, u+(x) is monotone
increasing for sufficiently large x, by Lemma 12. Take
z = min {t ∈ N : u+(x) is monotone on (ℓ∗t − 1,∞)}.
Now, let µ = infx∈[0,ℓ∗z]D+(x). By continuity ofD+(x) and compactness
of [0, ℓ∗z], µ > 0, since D+(x) > 0 for all x. Put N = ⌈ ℓ
∗
z
µ
⌉. Then for all
x ∈ [0, ℓ∗z], uN+ (x) ≥ µ · N ≥ ℓ∗z. Further, since u+(x) > x for all x, it
follows that whenever there is a run of length N from t, ℓt+N > ℓ
∗
z.
This implies that if there is a good run from t of length s ≥ N , then
ℓt+s ≥ ℓ∗s−z.

Appendix E. Distributions with polynomial tails
In this appendix we prove Theorem 6, showing that for private log-
likelihood distributions with polynomial tails, the expected time to
learn is finite.
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As in the setting of Theorem 6, assume that the conditional distri-
butions of the private log-likelihood ratio satisfy
G+(x) = 1− c
xk
for all x > x0(9)
G−(x) =
c
(−x)k for all x < −x0(10)
for some x0 > 0.
We remind the reader that we denote by ℓ∗t the log-likelihood ratio
of the public belief that results when the first t− 1 agents take action
+1. It follows from Theorem 3 that in this setting, ℓ∗t behaves asymp-
totically as t1/(k+1). Notice also that, by the symmetry of the model,
the log-likelihood ratio of the public belief that results when the first
t− 1 agents take action −1 is −ℓ∗t .
We begin with the simple observation that a strong enough bound
on the probability of mistake is sufficient to show that the expected
time to learn is finite. Formally, we have the following lemma. We
remind the reader that P+(·) is shorthand for P(· | θ = +1).
Lemma 17. Suppose there exist k, ε > 0 such that for all t ≥ 1,
P+(at = −1) < k · 1t2+ε . Then E+(TL) is finite.
Proof. Since TL = t only if at−1 = −1, P+(TL = t) ≤ P+(at−1 = −1).
Thus
E+(TL) =
∞∑
t=1
t · P+(TL = t)
≤ P+(TL = 1) +
∞∑
t=2
t · P+(at−1 = −1)
≤ 1 + k
∞∑
i=2
t
(t− 1)2+ε
<∞.

Accordingly, this section will be primarily devoted to studying the
rate of decay of the probability of mistake, P+(at = −1). In order
to bound this probability, we will need to make use of the following
lemmas, which give some control over how the public belief is updated
following an upset.
Lemma 18. For G+ and G− as in (9) and (10), |ℓt+1| ≤ |ℓt| whenever
|ℓt| is sufficiently large and at 6= at+1.
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Proof. Assume without loss of generality that at = +1 and at+1 = −1,
so that
ℓt+1 = ℓt +D−(ℓt).
Thus, to prove the claim we compute a bound for D−. To do so we
first obtain a bound for the left tail of G+. By assumption, for x > x0
(with x0 as in (9) and (10)),
g−(−x) = G′−(−x) =
ck
xk+1
and so by (4),
g+(−x) = e−xg−(−x) = ck e
−x
xk+1
.
Hence,
G+(−x) =
∫ −x
−∞
g+(ζ) dζ =
∫ −x
−∞
ck
eζ
(−ζ)k+1 dζ = ck
∫ ∞
x
ζ−k−1e−ζ dζ.
For ζ sufficiently large, ζ−k−1 is at least, say, e−.1ζ. Thus, for x suffi-
ciently large,
G+(−x) ≥ ck
∫ ∞
x
e−1.1ζ dζ =
ck
1.1
e−1.1x.
It follows that for x sufficiently large,
D−(x) = log
G+(−x)
G−(−x) ≥ log
ck
1.1
− 1.1x+ k log x ≥ −1.2x.
Thus, for ℓt sufficiently large,
ℓt+1 = ℓt +D−(ℓt) = ℓt + log
G+(−ℓt)
G−(−ℓt) ≥ ℓt + 1.2(−ℓt) = −.2ℓt
so in particular, |ℓt+1| < |ℓt|.

We will make use of the following lemma, which bounds the range
of possible values that ℓt can take.
Lemma 19. For G+ and G− as in (9) and (10), there exists an M > 0
such that for all t ≥ 0, |ℓs| ≤M · ℓ∗t for all s ≤ t.
Proof. For each τ ≥ 0, define
Mτ = max
|ℓτ |
ℓ∗τ
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where the maximum is taken over all outcomes. Note that there are at
most 2τ possible values for this expression, so Mτ is well-defined and
finite. Put
M = sup
τ≥0
Mτ .
To establish the claim, we must show that M is finite. To do this, it
suffices to show that for τ sufficiently large, Mτ+1 ≤Mτ .
Now, let u+(x) = x+D+(x) and u−(x) = x+D−(x). Then as shown
in the section about the model, whenever agent τ takes action +1,
ℓτ+1 = u+(ℓτ ), and whenever agent τ takes action −1, ℓτ+1 = u−(ℓτ ).
By Lemma 12, u+ and u− are eventually monotonic. Thus, there
exists x0 > 0 such that u+ is monotone increasing on (x0,∞) and u−
is monotone decreasing on (−∞,−x0).
For τ sufficiently large, ℓ∗τ > x0. Further, it follows from Lemma 18
that for τ sufficiently large, |ℓτ+1| < |ℓτ | whenever aτ 6= aτ+1 and
|ℓτ | > |ℓ∗τ |. Let (aτ ) be any sequence of actions with |ℓτ+1|ℓ∗τ+1 = Mτ+1. If
aτ 6= aτ+1
Mτ+1 =
|ℓτ+1|
ℓ∗τ+1
≤ |ℓτ |
ℓ∗τ
≤Mτ .
If aτ = aτ+1, then either Mτ+1 = 1, in which case Mτ+1 ≤ Mτ , or
Mτ+1 > 1. If Mτ+1 > 1, then since |D+| and |D−| are decreasing on
(x0,∞) and (−∞,−x0) respectively, |ℓτ+1 − ℓτ |/|ℓτ | ≤ |ℓ∗τ+1 − ℓ∗τ |/|ℓ∗τ |.
So
Mτ+1 =
|ℓτ+1|
ℓ∗τ+1
=
|ℓτ |+ |ℓτ+1 − ℓτ |
ℓ∗τ + |ℓ∗τ+1 − ℓ∗τ |
where the second equality follows from the fact that ℓτ and ℓτ+1 have
the same sign. Finally,
Mτ+1 =
|ℓτ |
ℓ∗τ
· 1 + |ℓτ+1 − ℓτ |/|ℓτ |
1 + |ℓ∗τ+1 − ℓ∗τ |/ℓ∗τ
≤ |ℓτ |
ℓ∗τ
≤ Mτ .
Thus, for all sufficiently large τ , Mτ+1 ≤Mτ .

Proposition 20. There exists κ > 0 such that P+(at = −1) < κt−2.1
for all t > 0.
Proof. Let β = −2.1/ log γ, where γ is as in Proposition 7. To carry out
our analysis, we will divide the event that at = −1 into three disjoint
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events and bound each of them separately:
A = (at = −1) and (Ξt > β log t)
B1 = (at = −1) and (Ξt ≤ β log t) and (|{s : s < t, as = +1}| ≥ 1
2
t)
B2 = (at = −1) and (Ξt ≤ β log t) and (|{s : s < t, as = +1}| < 1
2
t).
First, by Corollary 15 we have a bound for P+(A)
P+(A) ≤ c · 1
t2.1
.
Next, we bound P+(B1). This is the event that the number of upsets
so far is small and the majority of agents so far have taken the correct
action.
Since there are at most β log t upsets, there are at most 1
2
β log t
maximal good runs. Since, furthermore, there are at least 1
2
t agents
who take action +1, there is at least one maximal good run of length
at least t/(β log t).
Thus, P+(B1) is bounded from above by the probability that there
are some s1 < s2 < t such that there is a good run of length s2 − s1 ≥
t/(β log t) from s1 and as2 = −1.
For fixed s1, s2, denote by Es1,s2 the event that there is a good run
of length s2− s1 from s1. Denote by Γs1,s2 the event (Es1,s2, as2 = −1).
Then
P+(Γs1,s2) = P+(as2 = −1|Es1,s2) · P+(Es1,s2)
≤ P+(as2 = −1|Es1,s2).
By Lemma 16, there exists a z > 0 such that Es1,s2 implies that ℓs2 ≥
ℓ∗s2−s1−z. Therefore,
P+(Γs1,s2) ≤ G+(−ℓ∗s2−s1−z).
Since for t sufficiently large ℓ∗t > t
1
k+2 and since G+(−x) ≤ e−x by (4),
P+(Γs1,s2) ≤ e−α(s2−s1−z)
1
k+2 ≤ e−α(t/(β log t)−z)
1
k+2
.
To simplify, we further bound this last expression to arrive at, for some
c > 0,
P+(Γs1,s2) ≤ ce−t
1
k+3
for all t. Since B1 is covered by fewer than t
2 events of the form Γs1,s2
(as s1 and s2 are less than t), it follows that
P+(B1) < ct
2e−t
1
k+3
<
1
t2.1
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for all t large enough.
Finally we bound P+(B2). This is the event that the number of
upsets so far is small and the majority of agents so far have taken the
wrong action. As in B1, there is a maximal bad run of length at least
t/(β log(t)).
Denote by R the event that there is at least one bad run of length
t/(β log(t)) before time t and by Rs the event that agents s through
s+ t/(β log t)−1 take action −1. Since B2 is contained in R, and since
R is contained in the union ∪ts=1Rs, we have that
P+(B2) ≤ P+(R) ≤
t∑
s=1
P+(Rs).
Taking the maximum of all the addends in the right hand side, we can
further bound the probability of B2:
P+(B2) ≤ t · max
1≤s≤t
P+(Rs).
Conditioned on ℓs, the probability of Rs is
P+(Rs | ℓs) =
s+t/(β log t)−1∏
r=s
G+(−ℓr).
By Lemma 19, there exists M > 0 such that |ℓr| ≤ Mℓ∗t , for all r ≤ t.
Therefore, since G+ is monotone,
P+(Rs) ≤ G+(Mℓ∗t )t/(β log t).
It follows that
P+(B2) ≤ t ·G+(Mℓ∗t )t/(β log t).
Since G+(x) = 1− c · x−k for x large enough, and since ℓ∗t is asymptot-
ically at most t1/(k+0.5), we have that
logG+(Mℓ
∗
t ) ≤ −cM−k · t−k/(k+0.5).
Thus
P+(B2) ≤ t · exp
(−cM−k · t1/(2k+1)/(β log t)) ≤ t−2.1,
for all t large enough. This concludes the proof, because P+(at = −1) =
P+(A) + P+(B1) + P+(B2) ≤ κ 1t2.1 for some constant κ.

Given this bound on the probability of mistakes, the proof of the
main theorem of this section follows easily from Lemma 17.
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Proof of Theorem 6. By Proposition 20, there exists κ > 0 such that
P(at = −1 | θ = +1) < κ 1t2.1 for all t ≥ 1. Hence, by Lemma 17
E(TL | θ = +1) <∞. By a symmetric argument the same holds condi-
tioned on θ = −1. Thus, the expected time to learn is finite. 
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